I Goals of the paper
The preliminary ruling as described in Art. 234 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (ECT) was intended to represent the main instrument by which national courts, that are the domestic guarantors of the application of EC law, ask the European Court of Justice about its correct interpretation, by lodging a preliminary referral. Therefore, traditionally the literature has widely focused on this instrument as a tool of judicial cooperation between ordinary judges and the Court of Justice, with this latter playing the role of the "consultant" vis-à-vis national colleagues.
Many authors have also stressed the communicational difficulty between the Court of Justice and the Constitutional Courts due to the fact that most Constitutional Courts have avoided the preliminary ruling (with the Belgian, Austrian, Lithuanian and -within the limit of the "principaliter proceeding"-Italian exceptions). Few analyses have been devoted, instead, to the techniques of "hidden" dialogue invented by the Constitutional Courts to assure the coherence of the multilevel legal order and the national constitutional autonomy. There is, in fact, a dark and unexplored side of the relationship between Constitutional Courts and Court of Justice which feeds itself with the some non-orthodox ways of judicial communication.
The Court of Justice has reacted to this approach by alternating soft (persuasion: see Omega case) and hard (supremacy without exceptions: see Internationale Handelsgesellschaft) instruments in order to assure the respect for constitutional diversity and the reasons of the supranational integration.
In our opinion, this mutual attitude can be interpreted as a matter of judicial comity 1 : courts prefer to avoid wearying conflicts when their own existence is at stake. Thus they are ready to apply self-restraint and to conform their practices to a dialogic structure: regardless of where the final interpretive balance is put, the uniformity of the legal order is assured: national courts are reluctant to trigger a challenge to the Court of Justice and the Court of Justice is content with its (implicit) role of keeper of either the communitarian law, and of its coherent application.
When, on the contrary, an external subject (rectius: a judicial actor pertaining to another legal order) jeopardizes such virtual monopoly owned by the Court of Justice, then its reactions cease to show this cooperative feature, suffice it to recall the intransigent wording of Opinion 1/91, or the Mox Plant decision; in these cases comity was not the judicial policy to adopt, as the risk to avert was the fragmentation of the EC order.
Constitutional Courts accepted it in the following years: recently the Conseil Constitutionnel in 2004 8 and Tribunal Constitucional in Spain, 9 but before them in Great Britain 10 the Court of Appeal admitted the primacy of EC law by preserving a hard core of principles. One of the most interesting cases is the Danish one, Carlsen, 11 when the Supreme Court specified the possible dynamics of such a declaration. 12 More recently the decisions of the Polish 13 and German Constitutional Courts 14 (but see also the decisions of the Cypriot 15 and Czech 16 judges) have reproposed the issue of the ultimate barriers in the field of the European arrest warrant. 17 Despite these decisions, in this article we will just focus on the first pillar's ambit, thus we will avoid extending our reasoning to the third pillar. 18 This choice della persona umana'. On this point see M. Cartabia, Principi inviolabili e integrazione europea (Giuffrè, 1995 12 According to the Carlsen doctrine if there is a doubt about the consistency of the EC act with the Constitution, the Constitutional Courts could raise the question by asking the Court of Justice to clarify the exact meaning of the norm. If the Court of Justice did not convince them of the compatibility, they could "apply" the counter-limits theory. Such a vision demonstrates that the Constitutional Courts have the last word even though they have accepted the preliminary ruling. 13 Trybunał konstytucyjny, P 1/05, available at www.trybunal.gov.pl/eng/index.htm 14 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2236/04 (EAW case), available at www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/ 15 Ανώτατο Δικαστήριο, 294/2005, available at www.cylaw.org 16 Ústavní Soud, Pl. ÚS 66/04, available at http://angl.concourt.cz/angl_verze/doc/pl-66-04.php. 17 In the paper we will focus on the first pillar because of the differences existing between Art. 234 ECT and 35 EUT. As for the role of the Court of Justice in this ambit see: J. Komarek, 'European Constitutionalism and the European Arrest Warrant: in search of the limits of contrapunctual principles', Jean Monnet Working paper, 10/05, available at www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/05/051001.html. 18 The pillar structure is a helpful image reflecting the distribution of competences within the European order. The first pillar covers Community's policies. The second pillar concerns common foreign and security policy, whilst the third pillar covers police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. reflects the unique interpretative power owned by the Court of Justice in the first pillar, a power provided for under Articles 220(1), 234 and 292 of ECT. 19 In spite of the strictness shown in their decisions, the Constitutional Courts have never used this "weapon" in the field of EC Law and in the recent years the German Bundesverfassungsgericht changed its position by substituting the case by case control (hypothesized in Solange I) with an abstract control of the general compatibility of EC law with the demands of the protection of rights (Solange II, 20 
Maastricht,
21 Banana 22 ). Something similar happened in Italy with judgment No. 232/1989 23 : from that decision, in fact, the Italian Constitutional Court has implicitly admitted that the possible contrast with the Constitution would not cause the invalidity of the act of execution of the EC Treaty but only the non-applicability of EC rule.
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The fact that the Constitutional Courts have not ever put such counterlimits theory into practice can be partially explained by the progressive constitutionalisation of the EC law. The result of this constitutionalisation process is the progressive rapprochement between the common constitutional traditions and the counter-limits, between the rationale of integration and that of diversification.
With respect to the second premise: as we know, at the beginning of the relationship the two Courts (national Constitutional Courts and the Court of Justice) started from opposing positions of pure monism (Court of Justice) and dualism (Constitutional Courts).
During the following years this "pureness" was overcome and Constitutional Courts began to talk about two "autonomous and separated, 19 The first characteristic of the jurisdictional dialogue described is therefore the "mutability" 25 of the starting position of the Constitutional justices and of the Court of Justice.
Such a premise is very important to understand the situation of instability that characterizes the relationship between Constitutional Courts and the Court of Justice. On the one hand, the Constitutional Courts have progressively accepted the EC law supremacy and have entrusted its protection to the ordinary judges, despite the lack of a national or supranational clause of primauté.
On the other hand, the Constitutional Courts have claimed to maintain their own role (the role of the guardians of the national constitutional identity) without exceptions. They refused the acceptance of dangerous monistic visions in order to preserve the constitutional identity of their legal orders.
Obviously, despite this progressive convergence, the tension between these two actors has not been missing because of the progressive expansion of the Court of Justice's activity in national fields but in our opinion it is possible to draw a less pessimistic picture by considering some non-orthodox ways of judicial communication. 25 It is possible, indeed, to notice a strong evolution in the Italian Constitutional Court case-law: compare, for example, case No. 14/1964-where the Italian Constitutional Court interpreted the relationship between national and EC acts in the light of chronological criterion (on the basis of the fact that the enabling act of ratification of the European Treaties was an ordinary legislative act)-with cases No. 183/1973 -where the Constitutional Court recognized the constitutional basis of EC law supremacy in Art. 11 of the Italian Constitution -and 170/1984 (where the Italian Court entrusted such a control to the national ordinary judges). In Spain, the Tribunal Constitucional used Art. 93 of the Spanish Constitution as a basis to found the EC law supremacy without giving the EC law a constitutional degree in the legal sources system. Nevertheless, it is possible to notice a strong evolution in Tribunal Constitucional case-law from the judgment No. 28/1991 and Declaración No. 1/1992 up to the very recent declaration 1/2004. In this case the Spanish justices adopted a more substantial reading of Art. 93 of the Constitution, no longer conceiving it as a merely procedural clause. As we know, the German justices softened their argumentations after Solange I by conceiving a form of cooperation between courts for the protection of fundamental rights ("Kooperationverhältnis") although they have never completely abandoned the dualistic vision. Before 1992, then, they employed Art. 24 of Basic Law (on the participation to international organizations) to explain the penetration of the EC law.
II The techniques of hidden dialogue
Once assumed the supremacy of EC law, the Constitutional Courts dealt with another enigma: how could they guarantee the equilibrium between the levels as well as the dialogue with the Court of Justice?
As hierarchy. 37 Such an attempt has created confusion in the Constitutional Courts case-law itself, as the contradictions of the Tribunal Constitucional's findings demonstrate. In case no. 28/1991, in fact, the Tribunal Constitucional used two formulas to define the normative strength of the EC law -"non constitutional law" and "infra-constitutional law" -while in other cases it used the formula "constitutionally relevant (law)". 38 Consequently, according to the Tribunal Constitucional, the contrast between the EC law and the national law cannot be seen as a figure of unconstitutionality of the national rule: it is a question of legality which has to be resolved by the ordinary judges.
Similarly, there is an evident manipulation of the constitutional text operated by the Belgian Cour d'Arbitrage with regard to art. 34 of the Constitution in order to give a partial super-constitutionality to the EC law, still without endorsing the competence of its guarantee.
Something similar happened in England in the Thoburn 39 case. In this case, the judge recognized the existence of a constitutional group of statutes and acts: this group of constitutional statutes and laws also included the 1972 E.C. Act. In this way, the English judges guaranteed the reasons of the integration and the EC law supremacy but, at the same time, recognized that the supremacy rests in the acceptance and in the self-limitation of the English Parliament (i.e. in an Act of the Parliament).
Another example of the creative constitutional case-law is the distinction between "primacia y supremacia" conceived by the Tribunal Constitucional.
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This was done in order to explain the compatibility between the reasons of integration and the guarantee of the Constitution. A further proof of this trend is the very recent acknowledgement 41 of the exhaustibility of recurso de amparo when the ordinary judge refuses to refer to the Court of Justice ex Art. 234 ECT. If this refusal implies the violation of a fundamental right guaranteed by recurso de amparo, it is possible to proceed before the Tribunal Constitucional for violation of Art. 24 of the Spanish Constitution. By this revirement the Tribunal Constitucional has compensated the Court of Justice for the refusal to accept the mechanism of preliminary ruling.
The Italian Constitutional Court is particularly active in this field with expedients like the acknowledgement of erga omnes effects (ie the normal effects of the classical sources of law according to some scholars 42 ) to the interpretative rulings of the Court of Justice and the dual preliminarity ("doppia pregiudizialità"). 43 The first technique consists of the acknowledgment of the peculiar interpretative function of the Court of Justice: the Italian Constitutional Court has recognised erga omnes effects to the Court of Justice's rulings in its case-law (mainly in 113/1985 44 and 389/1989 45 ) because they share certain characteristics with the classic EC legal sources.
In the Italian Constitutional Court's reasoning, these interpretative rulings present the normal effect of the classical EC legal sources when they contain the interpretation of EC legal provisions characterized by such effects: direct applicability and direct effect. In this way the Italian Court put the classic EC acts (regulations, directives) on an equal footing with the Court of Justice interpretative rulings. Following this reasoning, according to the Italian Constitutional Court, the ordinary judge's duty to non-apply the internal law contrasting with the EC law has to be extended to the case of contrast between the national law and those interpretative rulings of the Court of Justice. The reasoning of the Italian Constitutional Court takes as its starting point the particular position covered by the Court of Justice in the EC legal system.
The interpretative rulings of the Court of Justice would be second grade sources because they infer their legal power from the interpreted provisions. In fact, the Italian Court recognised the content and the effects of the classic communitarian sources (direct effect and direct applicability) only if the interpreted provisions have such effects. This is an indirect recognition of the strong role of the Court of Justice and implies (for the national judge) the extension of the obligation of non-application of national law contrasting with the interpretative rulings of the Court of Justice.
According to the second technique (dual preliminarity), the Constitutional Court could be asked to solve a question of constitutionality regarding an Italian norm in cases where such a question is strongly related to another preliminary ruling question contemporarily raised before the Court of Justice (either by the same or by another ordinary judge) on the meaning/validity of an EC act.
If these two questions are strongly related, the Italian Constitutional Court can decide to return the question (declaring it "inadmissible") to the ordinary judge (536/1995 46 ) or "wait for" the Court of Justice to pronounce before judging (165/2004 47 ). As we can see, the dual preliminarity is a technique by which the Italian Constitutional Court recognizes a "priority" to the Court of Justice and to Art. 234 ECT questions; at the same time, it can work as a "safety valve", as it avoids a contrast with the Court of Justice with regard to the possible violation of the counter-limits. In Berlusconi case for example the Italian Constitutional Court (165/2004 48 ) waited for the Court of Justice's answer, preparing itself for a decision that could possibly be incompatible with its fundamental principles. All this was also caused by the Court of Justice's progressive orientation to accept questions concerning de facto the contrast between EC law and national legislative acts (although "dressed" as interpretative questions of EC law). Thanks to the dual preliminarity, the Italian Court allows the Court of Justice to decide whether to challenge the risk of a jurisdictional "clash" or not. On the other hand it is perhaps possible to read the Berlusconi case as an attempt to avoid such a danger, and as a chance to show the EC system ripeness about fundamental rights.
The very recent revirement 49 of the Italian Constitutional Court does not constitute a material change, since the Court accepted to raise the preliminary question to the Court of Justice only within the principaliter proceeding, a judicial procedure that bears some peculiar features (inter partes nature, absence of a quo judge etc). As we wrote in the incidenter proceeding the principle of "mutual impermeability" between EC and national law: was applied; according to the decisions No. 384/1994 and 94/1995 the Italian Constitutional Court decided to "centralise" the questions of consistency between national and EC law and to solve them within the framework of the principaliter proceeding.
The mechanism of the dual preliminarity, in fact, implies the existence of a judicial triangle (national a quo judge; national Constitutional Court and Court of Justice) which does not exist in the principaliter proceeding.
Another technique consists of the distinction between disapplication and non-application. In the Italian context, the Constitutional Court started to accept that the guarantee of the EC law's supremacy was entrusted to national judges with an important specification: technically, the judge can not "disapply" 50 the national law contrasting with the EC act but he must "not apply" the national rule contrasting with directly applicable EC law (a regulation, in the earlier case-law, 51 but then also self-executing directives 52 and interpretative rulings concerning directly effective and directly applicable norms, see cases no. 113/1985 53 and 389/1989 54 ). Disapplication, in the Constitutional Court's reasoning, is a figure of invalidity 55 which would presume a hierarchical relationship between supranational and national legal orders. It would imply the subordination of the Constitutional Court to the Court of Justice (the hierarchy between orders which conduct to the hierarchy of Courts) while non-application is a figure of inefficacy, limited to the specific case before the national judge. 56 The Italian case -along with the German one -is very relevant for a complete understanding of reasons underlying the "resistance".
Having a look at these techniques it is possible to notice a progressive rapprochement between the Courts (national and supranational) through nonorthodox ways. 50 56 The exceptions to this scheme are represented by the following: 1) the case of the "principaliter proceeding" (when the legislative act-which is supposed to be unconstitutional-is contested by a Region or the State on the basis of art. 127 of the Italian Constitution); 2) the case of contrast between national norms and non-directly effective or directly-applicable EC rules; 3) the case of violations of the national counter-limits; 4) within the control of admissibility of abrogative referendum 
III The Court of Justice's point of view
The Court of Justice itself has changed its position over the years showing a behaviour oscillating between constitutional accelerations and self-restraint, always looking at the possible effects of its decisions on national legal orders.
By attempting to apply the idea of the techniques of hidden dialogue to the Court of Justice's side, it is possible to identify three strategies: a) the progressive "refinement" of the idea of primacy, due to the double process of constitutionalisation of the EU and communitarization of the counterlimits; b) the terminological attention; c) the preventive evaluation of the impact of its case-law on the national legislation. In this part of the paper we will focus on the first technique devoting few comments to the other two.
First of all, it is possible to notice a progressive mitigation of the idea of absolute primacy of the EU law.
This statement can be supported by a rapid comparison between the "blind" supremacy of the Internationale Handelsgesellschaft 57 (para. 3) with latest judgements:
Therefore the validity of a Community measure or its effect within a member State cannot be affected by allegations that it runs counter to either fundamental rights as formulated by the constitution of that State or the principles of its constitutional structure.
We can notice that, according to the reasoning of the Court of Justice, the respect of fundamental rights is seen as an exception to the primacy of EC law.
This kind of argumentation was drawn on in a recent order of the European Court of First Instance (Gonnelli e Aifo v. Commission , para. 57) 58 :
Furthermore, in their observations on the objection of inadmissibility, the applicants cannot maintain that, to remedy this alleged lack of judicial protection, the Italian Constitutional Court could refrain from applying Community measures contrary to the fundamental rights proclaimed in the national Constitution since, in accordance with settled case-law, Community law has primacy over national law.
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Normally by the formula "constitutionalisation" of the EC legal order, the authors 60 mean the progressive shift of the EC law from the perspective of an The partial overcoming of the vision of Internationale Handelsgesellschaft was contained in the Omega case. In Omega, 64 the Court said that 'Community law does not preclude an economic activity consisting of the commercial exploitation of games simulating acts of homicide from being made subject to a national prohibition measure adopted on grounds of protecting public policy by reason of the fact that that activity is an affront to human dignity.' This statement should be read as the final line of a long run, which started after Solange I. This judgment intends to demonstrate (before a German judge: it is not a coincidence) the ripeness of the EU legal system and, in general, the outcome of the constitutional dialogue with the national interlocutors. Something similar happened in the Berlusconi 65 case (before an Italian reference). These argumentations are probably supported by strategic (and persuasive) reasons, due also to the broad notion of human dignity and of retroactive application of lenient penalty assumed by the Court; anyway it is clear that such decisions are the result of a long conversation with the national courts.
By doing this, the Court assumes the respect of fundamental rights as a premise of its discourse, rather than as an exception to the primacy of EC law.
This process of convergence between the languages of the (national and supranational) courts has contributed to the creation of a common axiological field between the different (constitutional) legal orders. This common axiological field can be described as the heart of multilevel constitutionalism.
The rapprochement between legal orders is confirmed by the 'structural continuity' between common constitutional traditions and counter-limits. From a theoretical point of view, in fact, the counter-limits are related to the input of the communitarian legal materials in the inner order; the common constitutional traditions, instead, are related to the input of inner legal materials in the European legal order. Apparently they both follow opposite routes and are inspired by different rationales: the former by the rationale of integration while the latter by the rationale of constitutional diversification. As stressed, however, by Ruggeri 66 thanks to the hermeneutical channel represented by the preliminary ruling, the constitutional principles of the inner legal orders arise from their origin (national level) and become common sources of EU Law; then these common constitutional traditions come back to the origin in a new form when they are applied by the Court of Justice.
This progressive communitarization of national fundamental principles can be seen as another limit for the EU law primacy, as the scholarship has stressed reading together Artt. I-5 (Art. 4 of EUT after the Reform Treaty of Lisbon) and I-6 of the Constitutional Treaty (disappeared in the Reform Treaty of Lisbon): in Art. I-5 of the Constitutional Treaty, in fact, we can find the proof of the communitarization of the counter-limits theory as a result of the judicial dialogue between Constitutional Courts and Court of Justice.
The model of Art. I-5 is undoubtedly represented by Art. 6 EUT ('current' version), which efficaciously described the closeness between common constitutional traditions and national fundamental principles: in this article, in fact, these two kinds of legal sources (common constitutional traditions 67 and national fundamental principles) are mentioned in two subsequent paragraphs.
It suffices to recall here the reference that the Art. 6 ('current' version), para. 2 makes to the common constitutional traditions, and the reference to the "national identities" of its Member States that is set in para. 3 of Art. 6. We argue that within a legal context, by the formula "national identities", the European legislator meant the constitutional identities of the Member States, that is the counter-limits, as defined by national constitutional courts. In this sense we can say that Art. I-5 of the Constitutional Treaty has only expressly codified such an interpretation by speaking about "constitutional structure" and in this way it delivered the interpretation of the counter-limits to the Court of Justice. Despite this structural continuity between common constitutional traditions and counter-limits, it is possible to find other recent cases 68 where the Court seems to accept a more "selective" vision of fundamental rights:
Thus, unlike other fundamental rights enshrined in that Convention, such as the right to life or the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, which admit of no restriction, neither the freedom of expression nor the freedom of assembly guaranteed by the ECHR appears to be absolute but must be viewed in relation to its social purpose. Consequently, the exercise of those rights may be restricted, provided that the restrictions in fact correspond to objectives of general interest and do not, taking account of the aim of the restrictions, constitute disproportionate and unacceptable interference, impairing the very substance of the rights guaranteed.
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In Schmidberger the Court of Justice distinguished between two groups of fundamental rights: the absolute rights (which admit of no restrictions) and other fundamental rights. Concerning the second category of rights, the Court of Justice admitted the necessity to evaluate through a case by case approach the proportionality of their possible restrictions. This selective and case by case approach seems to be in contrast with the very broad approach which the Court of Justice followed in Omega.
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In conclusion, in Schmidberger this balance between fundamental and economic rights could be questionable and could appear incoherent with the Court of Justice case-law because it comes just before the Omega case. Recently the Court of Justice went back to the selective and case by case approach to the fundamental rights (conceived in Schmidberger) in Laval 71 and Viking 72 cases. In these cases, the Court of Justice recognized the fundamental right to collective action as integral part of EU Community law. This right can justify restrictions on the fundamental freedom of establishment or on the freedom to provide services guaranteed under the EU Treaty, in order to protect workers and their conditions of employment. The Court of Justice added that this action is legal 'only if it pursues a legitimate aim such as the protection of workers' and it has left the decision of legitimacy in this case up to the national courts to decide, balancing the rationale of market integration with the rationale of social policies. 68 Concluding, the Court of Justice's activity could be read as swinging between the two poles identified above (high level of integration and preservation of differences): following this reconstruction this mixture of acceleration and deceleration is explicable, as Morbidelli 73 pointed out, by reading the different choices made by the Court in terms of proportionality, conceived as a costs/benefits analysis.
The progressive "softening" of the primacy is accompanied by the unclear result of the contrast between national and supranational laws. In Simmenthal 74 the Court specified that the contrast between EC law and national law implies the invalidity and the inefficacy of the latter.
As we have seen above, the Italian Constitutional Court contested the invalidity of the national law contrasting with EC law, by distinguishing between disapplication (figure of invalidity) and non-application (figure of inefficacy, which does not preclude the future application of the contested national act in other cases). As a form of partial concession, the Court of Justice stated in Imperial Chemical Industries (para. 34):
When deciding an issue concerning a situation which lies outside the scope of Community law, the national court is not required, under Community law, either to interpret its legislation in a way conforming with Community law or to disapply that legislation. Where a particular provision must be disapplied in a situation covered by Community law, but that same provision could remain applicable to a situation not so covered, it is for the competent body of the State concerned to remove that legal uncertainty in so far as it might affect rights deriving from Community rule. 75 Another interesting profile is provided by the terminology of the Court of Justice: usually the Court of Justice does not use the term "supremacy" (in Costa Enel, 76 for example, the Court of Justice used the words "primacy" or "precedence"). and scholars: the best example of this trend is confirmed by the debate about Art. I-6 of the Constitutional Treaty (disappeared in the Reform Treaty of Lisbon), that would have crystallised the so-called "supremacy clause". The word "supremacy", in fact, is borrowed from the term used by the American Constitution and presumes the existence of a perfect federal model and of a normative "monism". An evident exception to this 'linguistic trend' is provided by the French scholarship which has preferred to use the word 'primauté' instead of 'suprématie'in order to describe the priority given to the EC law. 79 Unlike classical federal experiences, the 'secret' 80 of the European Communities lies in the 'constitutional tolerance' 81 and the consequence of such a peculiarity is the impossibility of resolving the antinomies in terms of invalidity, as the Constitutional courts have maintained for many years.
Constitutional tolerance, in fact, implies a form of voluntary obedience to the EC law, which cannot be inferred by the existence of a hierarchy between legal orders.
Being forced to deal with this constitutional diversity, the Court of Justice has adopted a strategy that reminds us of the attitude of other international Courts, using a sort of margin of appreciation doctrine. 'The doctrine of the margin of appreciation, as developed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), is an interpretational tool by which the court can delineate between what is properly a matter for each community to decide at the local level and what is so fundamental that the same requirements are imposed on every State, regardless of variations in culture.' 82 This doctrine requires a certain attention to the legislative and factual situation of the national order involved in the case, and implies the need -for the Court of Justice -to immerge itself in the constitutional structure of the national laws in order to do a preventive evaluation of its judgments.
This would require a case-by-case approach by the Court of Justice and a more frequent use of comparative law tools before the EC judge.
We can find a confirmation of such an approach in the latest judgements dealing with the issue of State liability caused by the breach of EC law. In Konle (para. 64) 83 :
The answer to the fourth question must therefore be that, in Member States with a federal structure, reparation for damage caused to individuals by national measures taken in breach of Community law need not necessarily be provided by the federal State in order for the obligations of the Member State concerned under Community law to be fulfilled.
At the same time, it is possible to read Grant 84 and P v S 85 coherently by looking at the different impact of the Court of Justice's decisions on the factual background. In those cases it was self-evident that the acknowledgement of rights to homosexual couples would have had much worse financial repercussions on the Member States than those caused by the possible acknowledgement of transsexuals' rights. Consequently, such a decision would have been less understood by the States.
These are only two examples of the attention paid by the Court of Justice to the constitutional structures of the Member States and they can be seen as a strong hint of a judicial comity attitude by the Court.
IV Final remarks of the section -A glance at sentenza No. 102/2008
To conclude, we observe that the Court of Justice has sometimes reacted strongly to Constitutional Courts' strategy, by denying the possibility for the Constitutional Court to refuse the preliminary ruling; by denying the possibility that Italian acts contrasting with EC law could be valid; by denying the possibility to build some ultimate barriers (even though of constitutional degree) against the penetration of EC law.
In other cases the Court of Justice approached the Constitutional Courts showing the ripeness of its legal system (the recognition of the fundamental rights in Nold, 86 Stauder, 87 Omega 88 ) in order to gain the trust of the Constitutional Courts. Such an alternation of soft means (persuasion) and hard means (supremacy without exceptions) in the Court of Justice's activity is the result of two forces: constitutional tolerance and evolving dynamism. 89 In the Court of Justice's case-law it is not possible arrange this scheme on a chronological distinction (as the closeness in time of decisions which are so different proves) that would imply an "activist" first stage and a "persuasive" second stage. From the national point of view, the Constitutional Courts try to defend their jurisdiction and prerogatives, by inventing complicated mechanisms (dual preliminarity; erga omnes effects of the interpretative rulings; disapplication vs. non application; counter-limits) in order to balance the rationale of the jurisdictional dialogue and the rationale of the constitutional identity. The result of this interlacement is a situation of obliging instability characterized by a de facto synergy, despite formal and rhetorical calls for contrast.
Before turning to the next part of our essay, it is worth describing the recent behaviour of the Italian Constitutional Court. On April 15, 2008, 90 for the first time in its history, the Italian Constitutional Court agreed to raise a preliminary question to the Court of Justice, adopting a decision presenting at the same time features of continuity and rupture with regard to the previous case-law.
A continuity point is represented by the fact that the decisive criterion upon which the Constitutional Court decides to handle this EC procedure lies in the distinction between principaliter and incidenter proceedings. 91 The 2008 decision was drawn in a principaliter proceedings, this meaning that the Italian Constitutional Court acted as the "true" judge of the (abstract) controversy, as opposed to the incidenter proceedings, where the "true" judge of the real dispute is the referring judge. Accordingly, the Constitutional Court was ready to acknowledge for the first time that it falls under the scope of the definition of "court or tribunal" of Art. 234 ECT (rupture), but only in the case of a principaliter proceedings (continuity); and this exception comes from the past.
It is usually a task of the ordinary judge to review the consistency between domestic law and EC law, rather than a Constitutional Court's duty. However, in two old decisions (see sentenze No. 384/1994 and No. 94/1995), the Italian Constitutional Court already acknowledged that, since in the principaliter proceedings there is not an ordinary judge to carry out this task, the refusal by the Constitutional Court do so would have resulted in a dangerous gap in the protection of rights, and a breach of the principle of legal certainty. 90 Corte Costituzionale, sentenza No. 102/2008, available at www.cortecostituzionale.it. 91 The principaliter proceedings are related to claims lodged directly by the Central Government or by the Regions before the Constitutional Court. The incidenter proceedings, on the contrary, consist of claims filed by an ordinary judge (known as judge a quo, a Latin expression meaning "from which", referring to the fact that the question stems "from" the judge) who has a doubt on the constitutionality on a national provision he should apply. The former is a direct review of a piece of legislation which also entails an abstract nature, whereas the latter is a form of indirect review of the challenged provisions, that bears a concrete nature (i.e., the outcome of the constitutionality review is decisive for the settlement of the dispute pending before the referring judge).
Another consideration may be useful as regards the role of the ordinary judges: their contribution is important to the functioning of both the incidenter proceedings before the Italian Constitutional Court and the preliminary reference mechanism before the European Court of Justice: they are the doorkeepers entrusted with the initiation of both proceedings, and their cooperation is essential for the work of both the "higher" Courts.
We saw above that the technique of dual preliminarity 92 is based upon a judicial triangle: the national referring judge is due to raise two related questions to the European Court of Justice and to the Constitutional Court. As obvious, this can be true only in the framework of the incidenter proceedings; now that a formal channel of cooperation (the use of Art. 234 ECT) was opened in relation to the principaliter proceedings we can observe how the two instruments of dialogue coexist, at different levels: the institutional procedure and the hidden technique.
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This double approach reflects the double temptation of the Constitutional Court: on one hand it still wants to avoid a direct clash with a powerful competitor, and keeps implementing the dialogue incognito; on the other hand it would like to enter the interpretive arena in order to influence the outcome of the ECJ's construction of EC law, that more and more often affects the content and the interpretation of domestic EC-related law.
V An international law attempt to re-define and interpret these praxes
After giving this overview on the ever-evolving relationship between the Court of Justice and national constitutional courts, we will now try to form a possible interpretation of this set of facts using instruments drawn from traditional international law studies.
Moreover, we would like to fully merge the federal and the international law views on the European Union and Community: whereas hierarchical and/or constitutional reconstructions sometimes fall short of justifying the institutional competition between national courts and the Court of Justice, 94 the international law approach alone would erroneously ignore the supremacy discourse, that 92 See above in Section II. 93 The decision is also relevant as regards two other hidden techniques: whilst it seems to overlook the distinction between non-application and disapplication (the "disapplying" action was mentioned), it agrees upon the theoretical grounds of the separation between primacy and supremacy, when it gives a description of the domestic and supranational legal orders as being two autonomous systems, although integrated and coordinated. differentiates the EC legal order from the flattened international law system, in which actors are not supposed to depend on each other, but to bear equal powers.
Let us start by noting that many among the techniques we have described above can be easily traced back to some general principles of (international) procedural law. 95 We refer here to the principles of lis alibi pendens, of ne bis in idem, of res judicata, of electā unā viā, of estoppel. Whereas similar principles are easy to recognize and are commonly acknowledged within single legal orders, their force starts to fade when required to be effective across different systems. 96 In particular, whilst it can be questionable -at the state level -whether these principles of judicial coordination are binding, it is common to deem that they are not, when applied to a multilayered scenario. This preliminary consideration helps us to understand two things about this paper: first, all the dialogic techniques we have described so far are of a voluntary nature, 97 and therefore develop within a framework of spontaneous practices. Secondly, this cooperative attitude, being based more on a need for peaceful collaboration rather than on a formal obligation, closely resembles the definition of judicial comity, 98 as employed in international law theory. Instead, they demonstrate many other types of interrelationships, sometimes hierarchical, sometimes not, sometimes competing, sometimes collaborating. In other words, even when viewed very broadly, they do not make up a legal system.' In our paper we investigate those interrelationships that places themselves on the borderline between legally bound praxes and collaborating behaviours, still trying to figure out the actual (strategic) motivations that cause them. 97 As P. M. Dupuy states (see L'Unité cit., 1): 'L'examen de la structure actuelle des relations entre juridiction internes et internationales d'une part, internationales entre elles d'autre part, conduit en tout cas à la conclusion qu'au-delà de toutes les institutions juridiques, c'est d'abord dans la tète des juges eux-mêmes que se résout la question.' Given the lack of specific provisions, it rests with the judge to choose whether to take care of the unity of international law, and of the consistency of its application. 98 As J. Allard and A. Garapon recalls, the word comity comes from the Latin "comitas gentium", an expression referring to the benevolence and generosity of the peoples, a sort of international courtesy, see Les juges dans la mondialisation -la nouvelle révolution du droit, (2005) Editions du
We prefer here to rely on the concept of comity in the rendition(s) given by international law scholars, in order to elude the labyrinth of all the possible meanings comity can take in its different national versions. 100 We will then try to study the relationship between the Court of Justice and national constitutional courts according to a new and intentionally dualistic model.
Finally, a comparison will be sketched between the behaviour carried out by the Court of Justice towards national courts and the behaviour showed to international courts or tribunals, when the interpretation of EC law has been at stake. 101 The difference between these two situations depends (we will try to support this statement) less on the different connection that links the actors (parts of the same integrated order or belonging to different orders) than on the different strategy the Court of Justice wants to pursue (silent tolerance or hostile defence of its prerogatives).
VI The 'As Long As' mechanism as a comity device
Is there a possibility to extract an essential rationale from the Solange doctrine, and to use it as the foundation for an inter-level comity between judiciary bodies?
102 There is no need here to rehearse the meaning underlying the very well known as long as adage. Let us just recall briefly how the German Constitutional Court conceded a general rebuttable presumption of constitutionality to the EC This technique has been recognized to be of a surprisingly deferential nature, despite its smart formulation. It can easily be read as an act of surrender signed by the national court in the moment it realizes that the interpretive competition with the Court of Justice is a non-convenient strategy. Moreover it is a smooth escape from the impasse resulting from the Constitutional Court's refusal to use Art. 234 EC.
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights, in the Bosphorous case, 104 has recently refused to second-guess an EC regulation 105 which implemented a UN Security Council resolution, 106 although the content of the regulation was openly restrictive of a fundamental right, namely property right.
By doing this, the ECHR has recognized the limitative effect the EC act had on a basic right, but such a consideration was balanced by the importance of the purpose that determined this intentional restriction, and by the fact that the European Community system, overall, could guarantee a system of fundamental rights' safeguard which is comparable to that provided by the European Convention of Human Rights. 107 The same formula 108 (as long as) is used here to introduce a similar mechanism: there is a prima facie presumption that prevents a clash between jurisdictions and this presumption regards the protection of fundamental rights. 109 Para. 155 of the judgment reads, in fact:
In the Court's view, State action taken in compliance with such legal obligations is justified as long as the relevant organisation is considered to protect fundamental rights, as regards both the substantive guarantees offered and the mechanisms controlling their observance, in a manner which can be considered at least equivalent to that for which the Convention provides (...). By "equivalent" the Court means "comparable": any requirement that the organisation's protection be "identical" could run counter to the interest of international cooperation pursued (...). However, any such finding of equivalence could not be final and would be susceptible to review in the light of any relevant change in fundamental rights' protection (our italic).
Neither the European Court of Human Rights nor the German Constitutional Court felt that a diverging interpretation on the protection of fundamental rights, which is probably the most typical among their prerogative tasks, entitled them to intervene and reaffirm their primacy over the European Community order. Paradoxically, the safeguard of core rights, far from being the reason for the application of the counter-limit, was used as the harmonizing platform, and either tribunal sacrificed its own particular conception 110 to pledge allegiance to the Court of Justice, or to give it support.
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This is, in our opinion, a clear example of the 'legitimation through human rights' advocated by J. Habermas, 112 the kind of legitimation through which practices that 'deserve recognition' can be identified.
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Is this courteous practice something we can categorise, at least roughly? Here is where we must refer to international law concept of comity that we have mentioned above.
Before criticising its content, let us remind how comity is supposed to work in the harmonization of independent tribunals' action, by quoting a 1985
European public order" in the field of human rights (Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), judgment of 23 March 1995, Series A no. 310, § 75).' This wording recalls the counter-limit rhetoric, in which reactions are foreseen just in case of patent infringement of fundamental values. 110 As S. Douglas-Scott sharply concludes, see Bosphorous cit., 253. 111 According to E. U. Petersmann (see Do Judges cit., 21) the Solange mechanism that we have described 'should serve as a model for 'conditional cooperation' among international courts and national courts also in international economic law, environmental law and human rights law beyond Europe'. In addition, see the reasoning by N. Lavranos (quoted ibidem, 35 fn 99, from a forthcoming essay): the Author argues that the Solange method, and comity in general, could be conceived as the content of a peculiar obligation of the judge, that of settling a single dispute according to justice principles. 112 When the jurisdictions of two unrelated and independent tribunals extend to the same dispute, there is no rule of international law which prevents either tribunal from exercising its jurisdiction. However, in the interest of international judicial order, either of the tribunals may, in its discretion and as a matter of comity, decide to stay the exercise of its jurisdiction pending a decision by the other tribunal. Our analysis intends to take these criticisms into consideration, not to run the risk of blindly entrusting the comity device with our conclusive remarks. In fact, given that neither the constitutional integration (whose parameters are far from being univocally identifiable) nor the interjudicial comity are reliable parameters to solve jurisdictional conflicts according to a foreseeable legal rule (were it hierarchic or coordinative), 117 we must then follow a different pattern. Such a pattern could be used to envisage interpretative monopoly and exclusive authority as the real interests at stake. 
VII The struggle for survival and for interpretive monopoly
Let us now turn to analysing the Court of Justice's behaviour in what we shall call the interpretive competition among independent courts. Another attitude was shown by the Court of Justice towards international courts menacing its monopoly, something that does not match the relaxed and obliging dialogue we have described taking place between the European Court and national constitutional tribunals.
When the European Economic Area was founded, 119 a tribunal was to be established for the settlement of disputes arising between Parties: this new EEA Court was supposed to have a mixed jurisdiction, encompassing conflicts founded on either EEA or relevant EC provisions. 120 Due to the uncertain consequences this mixed system could trigger, the Commission requested the Court's opinion on this new judicial body, under Article 228(6) EC. 121 The Court of Justice issued the Opinion 1/91, 122 whose core statement was set in para. 51: 'The system of judicial supervision which the [EEA] Agreement proposes to set up is incompatible with the EEC Treaty. ' The main argument supporting this clear rebuttal resides in the nonrenounceable need for legal homogeneity: a duplication of the set of applicable norms and a duplication of the bodies charged with their adjudication could not lead to a consistent order; 123 but the real concern of the Court of Justice was clearly the risk of being bound by the decisions of a newcomer (the EEA Court): 124 in this case the macroeconomic simile is more than appropriate: the Court attained its monopoly position by obstructing the competition.
The consequence of the Court of Justice's Opinion was the re-negotiation of the EEA, and the inclusion in the new version of the Agreement of several clauses of coordination between the new EFTA Court and the Court of Justice, whose main effect is to tie to the Court of Justice's jurisprudence both this new tribunal and the EEA Joint Committee, a mixed 'forum in which views are exchanged and decisions are taken by consensus to incorporate Community legislation into the EEA Agreement.' 125 The Court of Justice gave its consent to the new system, by issuing its 1/92 Opinion. 126 The relationship between the WTO quasi-judicial dispute settlement mechanism and the Court of Justice presents similar features, even if this latter adopts a different legal reasoning in attempting to avoid DSB decision to be directly invoked before the Luxembourg Court. In particular, the Court of Justice has declared 127 that the direct effect of a decision issued by the Panel or the Appellate Body would undermine the margin of discretion that WTO Parties enjoy when they choose how to settle a dispute, because alternative ways of resolution would be ruled out if the EC act deemed illegal in the WTO framework were directly to be considered non-applicable in the EC framework. 128 It should nevertheless be maintained that, in case the EC were not to comply with a DSB decision by amending its legislation, the Court of Justice itself should conform to the DSB finding its decision on the validity of the opposed act. 129 It is in the WTO DSM -Court of Justice case that we will probably test in the near future the real character of the Court of Justice interpretive policy. Being that the WTO tribunals are 'uninterested' in such a need for monopoly felt by the Court of Justice, 130 let alone bound by any obligation to support it, the Court of Justice will have to find a balanced way to fully recognise the importance of the DSB case-law, without giving up too much of its power. 131 We can see in the Portugal -Van Parys jurisprudence another clear example of a traditional Court of Justice's strategy, ie the introduction of a controversial finding (in this case, the WTO decisions' lack of direct effectiveness) 132 coupled with some circumstantial qualifications (in this case, the safeguard of alternative techniques of dispute resolution) that should soften the impact of the new doctrine, by giving the impression that in different circumstances such a new trend will not apply. 133 It is possible that in the future the Court will discard these specifications to adopt a fully operative version of its view, but if that is the case it will have to dare the authority of the WTO dispute settlement system, which is far bigger than those of the EEA Court or the ITLOS Tribunal (see below).
More recently the Court of Justice harshly condemned Ireland 135 for having submitted a dispute with the United Kingdom to an international tribunal, 136 instead of referring to the European Court: that was perceived as an attempt to elude the exclusive monopoly that the Court of Justice has over the interpretation and application of EC law, even in cases where the facts at issue are only partially regulated by its norms (mixed agreements). As the Court itself distinctly states in the Mox Plant decision, an international agreement […] cannot affect the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court in regard to the resolution of disputes between Member States concerning the interpretation and application of Community law.
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In this case, again, the Court showed its willingness to reassess the absolute relevance of a principle (its exclusive jurisdiction) that has in fact a relative (internal) value: formally speaking, in fact, the prohibition referred to in Art. 292 is binding only within the EC system. 138 We can easily observe how the Court preferred to centralise the jurisdiction, rather than to pay attention to the specialisation of any other concurrent forum; by doing this the Court neglected construction of a possible 'judiciary federalism'. 139 In fact, the Court sanctioned the reciprocal exclusion of two overlapping jurisdictions, rather than recognizing the competence of both, and a criterion to follow in order to choose the more opportune between them.
VIII Possible perspectives: the Court of Justice role and its fading integrative mission
It is worth noting here how the recent enlargement of the EC membership has triggered significant changes in the Court of Justice's structures and functioning. New judges joined the Court of Justice line-up, judges either coming from new Member Countries or being appointed to replace an exiting judge. New Advocates General were appointed as well. The new set up of the Court could conceal a new direction of its action. Judges from new Member States could have missed the integration training that took place in the last half century, and could ignore the integration mission that the Court of Justice had in the past. 140 New Courts (rectius, the Court in its future formations) will certainly avail itself of the past conquests, on whose principles their findings will be based, but their purpose will maybe be different, and their concerns about the role and the survival of the Court higher. 141 It would be therefore a rash attempt to draw from our consideration some prescriptive instructions: the interpretive struggle we have described was deeply influenced by the times it was set into, and in the future different conditions will most probably lead to different behaviours. The instability we have recalled above (better: the shifting positioning adopted by the Court of Justice) might have more evident effects.
That does not mean that such different attitudes will not be suitable of being interpreted in a similar manner: the struggle for (interpretive) power is going to be the constant factor determining the behaviour of the Court of Justice, possibly more than the European integration process. 142 We will have the opportunity to verify the legitimacy of some neo-realistic worries, in other words we will check whether the independency of the Court before national governments is doomed to decrease, now that the integration momentum seems to be over. 143 We recall here for the sake of completeness how the Court of Justice and the Court of First Istance, far from playing the tyrant role has indeed shown some signs of deference, namely towards the European Convention of Human Rights and UN Security Council acts, respectively in the Schmidberger and in the Yusuf and Kadi cases. 144 In particular, it is interesting to see how our model (which compares the Court of Justice -national courts relationship with the international tribunals -Court of Justice one) is not something ignored by the EC institutions: in the Kadi decision 145 the parallel between the UN -EC and the EC -Member States systems is clearly drawn, by reference to the Internationale Handelsgesellschaft case law. Now that we have become familiar with the concept of comity, and we have seen how its discretionary nature often hides self-interest considerations, 146 we can easily imagine a future scenario in which the Court of Justice itself will apply self-restraint (by means of comity, or deferential praxes) in order to better safeguard its existence and the persistence of its powers, vis-à-vis the rise of the WTO Dispute Settlement Bodies' authoritativeness, the universalising pretensions of the UN Security Council and of the EctHR, 147 and the lobbying pressure by Member States' governments. In particular, the Court of First Instance states that the possible infringement of a EC fundamental right can not affect the validity of a Security Council resolution, and suggests that an analogue relationship is to be found in EC law, where an EC act can not suffer from the possible violation of a nationally protected right. 146 See J. Allard and A. Garapon, La mondialisation cit.: the Authors recognize that often judicial cooperation must be set into an egoistic framework, given that it could well be that the reasons triggering comity are the same that, in other occasions, determine the rise of competition between courts. 147 See A. Rosas, The European Court of Justice cit., 10. The Author underlines how the consistent praxis followed by the ECJ is that of backing up the interpretation given by the Court of Human
